Thesis supervisor: László Halász
Location of studies (in Hungarian): https://kpvk.pte.hu/hu/filozofia_doktori_iskola Abbreviation of location of studies: KPVK
Description of the research topic:
Can a philosophical theory be expected to contain impeccable premises and conclusions derived from them according to the strict rules of logic, or should we be content with less than that? According to David Lewis, philosophy is not a collection of conclusive statements, but of arguments that are in epistemic equilibrium. Saul Kripke argues similarly in Naming and Necessity in which he explicitly states that he is merely seeking a better approach than before, not a closed theory. This problem arises not only in philosophy, but also in science, as philosophers of science, including Thomas Kuhn, have pointed out. Having accepted this, we must reckon with the possibility that there may be several rational yet contradictory arguments about the same thing. The history of philosophy seems to justify this, because even the most thoroughly thought-out systems contradict each other on many points, and we can only favor one or the other on the basis of subjective preferences. Based on these considerations, the methods of rational reasoning, the possibilities and limitations of its application, and its relation to the requirement of the Lewisian epistemic equilibrium should be examined
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